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THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
DOCTRINE AND MANDATING NORPLANT
FOR WOMEN ON WELFARE DISCOURSE
LAURENCE C. NOLAN*
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable govern-
mental benefit and even though the government may deny him the
benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to
a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests....
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
The current movement for welfare reform' has caused both
federal2 and state legislatures' to seek quick solutions to revive a
failed welfare system. The system is perceived to have failed mothers
who receive welfare benefits for their dependent children. Three
themes underlie many of the recommended solutions: 1) mothers
receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (hereinafter
AFDC) benefits for a long period of time become increasingly
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1. SeeLucy A. Williams, TheIdeology ofDivision:BehaviorModification Welfare Reform Proposals,
102 YALE LJ. 719 (1992) (discussing the recent attempts to "reform" welfare by modifying the
behavior of recipients).
2. E.g., Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (requiring some welfare mothers to enroll in training programs
as a condition for welfare). One such training program is: The Job Opportunities and Basic
Skills Training Program, Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988). See also Martha L. Fineman, Images of
Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE LJ. 274, 277 (1991) (discussing the Family Support Act
of 1988).
3. See, e.g., Act ofJan. 21, 1992, ch. 526, 1991 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 2782 (West) (denying
any additional benefits for recipients who parent new children while on welfare); 1987 Wis. Laws
27 (conditioning the retention of welfare benefits on a child's school attendance, popularly
known as "learnfare").
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dependent on aid and have their sense of a work ethic undermined;4
2) mothers, especially minority, unwed, teenage mothers, receiving
AFDC benefits continue having children in order to receive more
benefits;5 and 3) these mothers and their children are costly to
taxpayers.6 Given its potential for controlling women's reproduction,
it is little wonder, then, that the Norplant contraceptive device7 has
been heralded as an important factor in welfare reform.
Since the 1960s, very few new birth control methods for females
have been developed; however, this trend changed in 1990, when the
Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter FDA) approved the use
of Norplant in the United States.' The introduction of Norplant, a
contraceptive designed to provide up to five years of continuous, but
reversible, birth control,9 immediately attracted the attention of trial
courts and state legislatures. Courts sought to use it as a condition for
probation in the criminal justice system,' ° and state legislatures
4. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 2, at 277 (noting that the Family Support Act of 1988
"focus[es] on reinforcing the work ethic and dominant individualistic norms of self-sufficiency
through the imposition of'workfare' provisions for mothers ofyoung children"); Williams, supra
note 1, at 719-20 (outlining the "rhetoric of the current 'welfare reform' debate [which
includes] ... dysfunctional mothers incapable of fitting into mainstream society... [who] are
economically and emotionally atrophied because of their 'dependence' on welfare") (comparing
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733,785 (1964) with LAWRENCE N. MEAD, BEYOND
ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 41 (1986)). See also GEORGE GILDER,
WEALTH AND POVERTY 111-13 (1981) (noting that in 1979, the average income for a welfare
family of four was greater than the average American family median income which encouraged
those who could be self-supporting to remain on welfare); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND
148-53 (1984) (describing the Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiment that conservative
economists advocated instead of a welfare system since they felt that all welfare subsidies discour-
aged the poor from working).
5. See Fineman, supra note 2, at 280 ni l1 (citing several statements made by a Congressio-
nal Representative in opposition to the Family Support Act, which hypothesized a welfare
mother staying on welfare indefinitely by having a child every two years).
6. Primetime Live (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 9, 1993).
7. See infra part II (discussing the development, history, and use of Norplant as a tool to
control contraception).
8. Long-Term Contraceptive Approved, [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 43,066 (Dec. 26, 1990); Melissa Burke, Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of the
Norplant ContraceptiveDevice as a Condition of Probation, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 207,207 (1992).
9. Burke, supra note 8, at 207 (describing how the implant can be easily removed).
10. The most notorious case was People v. Johnson, No. 29390 (Cal. Super. Ct., Tulare
County 1991) (ordering a convicted child abuser to use Norplant for three years as a condition
for probation). See Stacey L. Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Contro Woman Contro or
Crime Control?, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1992) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the Johnson
case and the constitutionality of mandating Norplant as a condition for probation). See also
Tracy Ballard, The Norplant Condition: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.
139 (1993) (describing the statutory problems with imposing Norplant on welfare recipients);
Burke, supra note 8 (exploring the constitutional problems with conditioning probation on the
use ofNorplant);Janet F. Ginzberg, Note, Compulsiy Contraception as a Condition of Probation: The
Use andAbuse of Norplant 58 BROOK. L. REv. 979 (1992) (arguing that the imposition of Norplant
is unconstitutional and poor public policy); Madeline Henley, Comment, The Creation and
Perpetuation of the Mother/Body Myth: Judicial and Legislative Enlistment of Norplant, 41 BuFF. L. REV.
703 (1993) (discussing the myth that women's conduct can be explained by and controlled
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began to see it as part of welfare reformn." States have even made
Norplant available for welfare recipients through Medicaid.12 Some
states proposed legislation to provide financial incentives to welfare
recipients who use Norplant 5  Two states proposed legislation to
mandate its use for some welfare recipients. 4
This article contends that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
must be part of the discourse regarding welfare reform and contra-
ceptives, especially if the government begins to mandate the use of
contraceptives such as Norplant. The simplest statement of the
doctrine is that in conditioning the receipt of a government benefit,
the government must not be allowed to do indirectly what it cannot
do directly.5 This article consists of four parts. Part I provides a
historical background on welfare reform. Part II describes the
Norplant contraceptive system. Part III discusses how linking the use
of the Norplant system to welfare reform affects various individual
rights. Part IV addresses the role of the unconstitutional conditions
through their reproductive capacity); Kristyn M. Walker, Note, Judicial Control of Reproductive
Freedom: The Use of Norplant as a Condition of Probation, 78 IOWA L. REv. 779 (1993) (discussing
the imposition of Norplant as the latest of several attempts by the government to control
reproductive freedom).
11. Legislatively encouraging the use of Norplant typifies the dramatic turnaround in state
contraceptive policy. Before Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and its progeny, the
states' policies towards contraceptives were to restrict their availability. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497 (1961) (discussing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32,54-196 (1958), which, although later
repealed, criminalized both using and providing medical advice on contraceptives).
12. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-133 (Supp. 1993) (requiring the Tennessee
Department of Human Services to provide information on the availability of Norplant through
the Medicaid program); WASH. REV. CODE § 74.09.800 (Supp. 1994) (requiring the Washington
Department of Health and Social Services to provide information about Norplant as part of its
family planning services).
13. See, e.g., H.B. 2089, Kan. 74th Leg., 2d Sess. (1991) (offering women receiving AFDC
benefits a free Norplant implant and a $500 cash grant); David S. Coale, Note, Norplant Bonuses
and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 71 TEX. L REV. 189, 195-96 (1992) (discussing
proposed bills in Kansas and Louisiana to give cash grants to female welfare recipients who
agree to use Norplant).
14. H.B. 3207, S.C. (1993); S.B. 2895, Miss. (1992). SeeJohn Robert Hand, Note, Buying
Fertility: The Constitutionality of Welfare Bonuses for Welfare Mothers Who Submit to Norplant Insertion,
46 VAND. L. REv. 715, 718 (1993) (describing proposed legislation in Mississippi which would
mandate Norplant use in some cases); Henley, supra note 10, at 749-51 (discussing a bill
considered by the Mississippi Senate which would have "required women with four or more
children to be implanted with Norplant in order to qualify for or continue to be eligible for
public assistance[,]" as well as several other states' proposed programs offering incentives to
encourage women to be voluntarily implanted); ALAN GUTrMACHER INSTITUTE, NORPLANT:
OPPORTUNITIES AND PERILS FOR LOW-INCOME WOMEN (Dec. 1992) (Special Report #1).
15. See infra part IVA (describing in greater detail the "unconstitutional conditions
doctrine"). The conditions that this article considers are ones that influence conduct. The
government provides a benefit on the condition that the recipient alters some type of conduct
which is constitutionally protected from government interference. For a further discussion of
this doctrine, see generally Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theoy of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L REv. 1185, 1189 (1990); Albert J. Rosenthal,
Conditional Federal Spendingand the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103, 1114 (1987); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1421-22 Q989).
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doctrine in the discourse and is divided into three sections. Section
A describes the doctrine itself. Section B explores the reasons why
the doctrine must be part of the discourse. Section C discusses how
the courts have applied the doctrine and concludes that the fairest
way to apply it in welfare benefits cases is to treat the condition as
though it were direct
PART I. WELFARE REFORM BACKGROUND
Historically, the policy underlying assistance to the poor contained
the idea that only the "deserving poor," such as the blind, deaf,
insane, and orphaned, should receive assistance. 6 Strands of this
type of reasoning continue to appear today in discussions concerning
public assistance policy 7 Prior to 1935, there was essentially no
national policy for public assistance to the poor;"8 instead, private
groups or local cities and counties provided welfare relief."9
Because of the depression in the 1930s, the number of persons in
need of public assistance dramatically increased.0 States were
overwhelmed by the costs of such assistance.2 1 In an effort to
provide some relief to the states, Congress enacted the Federal
Emergency Relief Act of 1933,22 thus beginning a national policy for
public assistance.3  Two years later, Congress enacted the Social
Security Act of 1935.24 This Act created three programs: the
unemployment insurance program, the old-age insurance program,
and a federal aid program to those states providing cash relief to
"unemployables," such as the old, the blind, and the orphaned.25
The AFDC program26 provided assistance for needy children
16. J.M. Wedemeyer & Percy Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALL. REV. 326,327-28
(1966); Williams, supra note 1, at 721; Fineman, supra note 2, at 279-80. See also King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 320 (1968).
17. Fineman, supra note 2, at 279-80 (indicating that the purpose of the Family Support Act
of 1988 was to promote a new work ethic, thereby implying that the poor lacked such an ethic).
18. See generally Wedemeyer & Moore, supra note 16 (discussing the patchwork of public
assistance programs that existed prior to the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935).
19. Wedemeyer & Moore, supra note 16, at 326.
20. Williams, supra note 1, at 722.
21. Williams, supra note 1, at 722.
22. Pub. L. No. 73-15, ch. 30, § 4(a), 48 Stat. 57 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 724
(1988)).
23. Williams, supra note 1, at 722.
24. Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f
(1988)).
25. Williams, supra note 1, at 722 (discussing the target populations of the Social Security
Act of 1935); see Wedemeyer & Moore, supra note 16, at 329-34 (providing a comprehensive
discussion of groups targeted for federal assistance).
26. See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 627 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 301-1304 (1988)) (stating that this program was initially named Grants to States for
Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)). See also Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No.
[Vol. 3:15
Fall 1994] MANDATING NORPLANT FOR WOMEN
whose parent was deceased, absent, or incapacitated. 7 The program
was targeted to provide relief for children living with their widowed
mothers; however, the states were allowed to impose eligibility
requirements, such as conditioning benefits upon the sexual behavior
of women, which often made children ineligible for aid. 8 Through
subsequent legislation in 1950, the program was extended to cover
the caretakers of dependent children29 and in 1962, to cover families
with an unemployed parent and dependent children.30 During the
1960s and 1970s, the program continued to expand3l as part of the
"War on Poverty" initiatives 32 and because of court decisions that
overruled state regulations which prevented eligibility.3 During that
period, the government focused on the eradication of poverty and did
not blame the poor for their economic plight. 4 Overall, the
concept of welfare as an entitlement emerged. 5
By the 1980s, many people concluded that the AFDC program had
to be reformed.36  Books by scholars George Gilder 7 and Charles
87-543, § 104(a) (3), 76 Stat. 172, 185 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1394 (1988))
(noting that the name was changed to Aid and Services to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) in 1962).
27. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 629 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301-1304 (1988)).
28. SeeWilliams, supra note 1, at 723 (contending that the program targeted white, widowed
mothers and their needy children, but intentionally excluded single black women); King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309,311-22 (1968) (citing ajudicial summary of welfare for the "worthy poor").
29. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, § 323, 64 Stat. 477, 551
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 606(b) (1988)).
30. Social Security Act Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, §§ 108(a), 109, 152, 76
Stat. 185, 189-90, 206-07 (codified at42 U.S.C. § 606(b) (1988)); see'Wedemeyer & Moore, supra
note 16, at 333 (noting the extension of benefits to groups other than children).
31. SeeWilliams, supra note 1, at 724-25 (citing that the welfare movement began to include
groups previously excluded).
32. Seegenerally Thomas Ross, TheRhetoric of Poverty: Theirlmmorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO.
LJ. 1499, 1506 (1991) (describing the initiatives, which were developed during a time of
economic growth, to help the poor without stigmatizing them as immoral).
33. See, e.g., New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (overturning a
regulation that denied AFDC benefits to families with children born out of wedlock); Lewis v.
Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) (striking down a regulation which included for AFDC qualification
the income of the man who shared the mother's home and had no obligation to support the
child); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (invalidating a regulation which disqualified from
AFDC any mother cohabiting with a man who was not obligated to support the child).
34. See Ross, supra note 32, at 1507 (referring to notions that welfare recipients are
undeserving and not truly needy based on their supposed immorality); Williams, supra note 1,
at 724-25 (describing welfare recipients as moral deviants who manipulate public assistance funds
for personal economic gains).
35. Williams, supra note 1, at 724 nn.34, 37 & 39. See generally Charles Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964) (introducing the term 'New Property' and extending the idea
of property rights in government largess in the form of public assistance).
36. See GILDER, supra note 4, at 111 (emphasizing that AFDC presents a moral dilemma
because AFDC increases fatherless, dependent fatuilies); MURRAY, supranote4, at 159-66 (noting
that the receipt of AFDC funds creates a disincentive to marry and acquire employment).
37. See generally GILDER, supra note 4 (using the tools of sociology to describe the limitations
of contemporary economics in analyzing the disparities between the rich and the poor).
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Murray greatly influenced the welfare reform debate. They
concluded that public assistance increased poverty, created depen-
dence and immorality, and undermined traditional values.39 Murray
also concluded that poor people were motivated by economic
incentives.4" Many current welfare reform initiatives are based on
these conclusions.41 One of the numerous ways legislatures have
proposed to remedy welfare's ills has included predicating a welfare
mother's receipt of benefits on her use of Norplant.42 Before
discussing the constitutionality of such a requirement, it is helpful to
gain first a better understanding of Norplant itself. With this goal in
mind, the following section describes the Norplant contraceptive
system in greater detail.
PART II. THE NORPLANT CONTRACEPTIE SYSTEM.
The FDA approved the Norplant contraceptive system in December
1990 for general use by women.43 The system consists of six small
silastic rods, each containing the synthetic hormone levonorgestrel. 4
This device is implanted surgically under the skin of the woman's arm
near the elbow joint.4' The surgical removal of the system is a
longer, more difficult procedure than the implantation." The
hormone slowly filters through the rods into the woman's blood-
38. See generally MURRAY, supra note 4 (discussing the change in character of the poor and
the growth of welfare expenditure in the United States from 1950 to 1980).
39. See GILDER, supra note 4, at 111-12, 114-27 (stating how the prospect of receiving welfare
benefits eliminates the breadwinner role of the father, dissolves the traditional two parent family,
encourages public assistance fraud, increases government spending for income programs well
over GNP earnings, and overall makes welfare funds more attractive than a minimum wage job);
see also MURRAY, supra note 4, at 147-66, 178-91 (discussing the disincentives to work, marry, and
maintain a certain socio-economic status due to the increase of welfare expenditures by the
United States Government); Williams, supra note 1, at 725 (referring to works by authors who
identified the differences between the truly needy and unworthy poor).
40. MURRAY, supra note 4, at 156-62.
41. See Williams, supra note 1, at 725 (contending that current welfare reform stems from
the idea that there are unworthy recipients); see also id. at 726-46 (discussing the Learnfare and
Family Cap welfare reform programs in Wisconsin which stemmed from the belief that some
welfare recipients are unworthy).
42. See supra notes 13-14 (referring to states that have proposed conditioning the receipt
of welfare benefits on a woman's use of Norplant).
43. Long-Term Contraceptive Approved, supra note 8; see Coale, supra note 13, at 189 n.3
(noting that Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories is the United States' distributor of Norplant).
44. See WYETH-AYERST LABORATORIES, WOULD YOU LIKE UP To 5 YEARS OF CONTINUOUS
BIRTH CONTROL THAT IS REVERSIBLE? (1992) (describing levonorgestrel as a progestin that has
been used in the pill since the 1960s).
45. See Long Term ContraeptiveApproved, supra note 8, at 43,066 (describing the 10-15 minute
procedure performed under a local anesthetic and in a doctor's office).
46. See WYETH-AYERST LABORATORIES, supra note 44 (estimating that removal of Norplant
is a 15-20 minute procedure).
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stream.47  The rods contain enough levonorgestrel to prevent
pregnancy for five years. 48
Norplant is considered ninety-nine percent effective as a method of
birth control.49 Once removed, the subsequent conception rate for
women formerly implanted with Norplant is the same as that of
comparable women who were not implanted." Common side effects
may include menstrual cycle irregularity, headache, nausea, nervous-
ness, and dizziness." Norplant, however, does not protect against
the transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and other
sexually transmitted diseases (STD).2
The effectiveness of the contraceptive device, once implanted, does
not depend upon the user or the user's sexual partner." Further-
more, the user cannot remove it without medical assistance.54 Thus,
the woman is powerless to decide that she wants to try to conceive
and then act on that decision. For these reasons, some proponents
of welfare reform find Norplant an attractive contraceptive for women
receiving AFDC benefits, even though individual rights may be
affected.
PART III. LINKING NORPLANT To WELFARE REFORM AFFECTS
VARIOUS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS55
After the FDA's approval of Norplant, the federal and state
governments rapidly added it to their welfare programs by making it
available to welfare recipients.56 For instance, some state legislatures
proposed "bonus" programs awarding cash bonuses to women
47. Irving Sivin, Norplant Clinical Tria, in DIMENSIONS OF NEW CONTRAcEPTIVES: NORPLANT
AND POOR WOMEN 1 (Sarah E. Samuels & Mark Smith eds., 1992) [hereinafter NORPLANT AND
POOR WOMEN].
48. Id.
49. Coale, supra note 13, at 189.
50. WyETH-AYERST LABORATORIES, supra note 44.
51. WYETH-AYERST LABORATORIES, supra note 44.
52. NORPLANT AND POOR WOMEN, supra note 47, at xiv-xv.
53. NORPLANT AND POOR WOMEN, supra note 47, at xii-xiii, 1.
54. NORPLANT AND POOR WOMEN, supra note 47, at xi.
55. Norplant legislation also raises equality issues. For instance, Norplant legislation
uniquely affects females. Although contraceptives are not uniquely female, the history of
contraceptive technology focused upon the female. Further, this legislation overtly discriminates
against lower socio-economic classes. The legislation, facially neutral as to race, also
disproportionately affects minorities. For example, in the 1991 fiscal year, 40.1% of the children
receiving AFDC funds were black and 18.5% were Hispanic. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 1991 Aid to Families with Dependent Children Recipient Characteristics Study
6.
56. See Coale, supra note 13, at 189 (identifying the various governments that include
Norplant as an option in their welfare programs).
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receiving AFDC benefits as long as they agreed to use Norplant 7
Others, going further, proposed legislation mandating that some
women use Norplant as a condition of receiving AFDC benefits."
The focus of the debate for the proponents of these bills centers
upon the following: the scarcity of the state's resources; the allegation
that the welfare system creates intergenerational dependency; the
opinion that welfare undermines the work ethic; and, the opinion
that only mothers who can afford to care for their children, indepen-
dent of public resources, should have children. 9 The debate's
focus, however, fails to discuss the serious constitutional issues raised
by these bills.
Legislation that links Norplant to welfare benefits infringes upon
*the protected fundamental rights of mothers."0 The Constitution
protects such rights from government interference unless the state
can show a compelling need.6' Since 1965, the right of privacy
umbrella has protected the fundamental rights affected by Norplant
legislation.6'
Two branches of the right to privacy exist, and Norplant legislation
would affect both. One branch involves the broad right to privacy in
sexual matters,63 including the fundamental rights to procreate, 
4
to use contraceptives, 65 to parent,66 and to define the family.
6 7
57. H.B. 2089, Kan. 74th Leg., 2d Sess. (1991); H.B. 1584, La. 17th R.S. (1991). Seegenerally
Coale, supra note 13, at 189-94 (stating that Kansas and Louisiana introduced bills which
established bonus programs).
58. S.B. 2895, Miss. (1992); H.B. 3207, S.C. (1993). In contrast, a proposed California bill
provided that no person would be required to use contraceptives as a condition for eligibility
for public assistance. Cal. Assembly 3593, Reg. Sess. (1993) .
59. See Pyimeime Live supra note 6 (citing statements made by Roland Coming, a South
Carolina state legislator, that mandating Norplant for women who want welfare would benefit
states financially).
60. See Arthur, supra note 10, at 61-63 (noting that court-ordered Norplant for criminal
cases in connection with probation also impinges on fundamental rights).
61. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
62. Id. at 485-86 (addressing, more generally, the interrelation of a contraceptive mandate
and constitutional rights such as personal security and liberty).
63. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (identifying the right of privacy as a constitutionally
protected right even though this right is not explicitly found in the Constitution). The majority
and concurring opinions in Griswold relied on the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to infer a general right of privacy applicable to the federal government and to the
states. Id. Since that time, such fundamental rights as procreation, contraceptive use, and
parenting have been described as being under the privacy umbrella. Id. at 485-86; see also
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (extending the concept of fundamental rights
to procreation); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (extending fundamental rights to
parenting).
64. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (recognizing the right to procreate as a fundamental right).
The Court identified the right to marry and procreate as basic civil rights "fundamental to the
very survival of the race." Id.
65. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (recognizing the right of unmarried
people to use contraceptives); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (1965) (recognizing the right of
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The other affected branch involves the privacy right in personal or
individual autonomy.' For example, one has a constitutionally
protected right to bodily integrity regarding nonconsensual medical
treatment, known as the principle of informed consent.69 The
principle of informed consent involves two elements: being informed
about the treatment and giving one's consent.7 ° Mandating the use
of Norplant violates this principle because consent must be given
freely, without any form of coercion. The principle of informed
consent is central to medical ethics and legal doctrine. 71 It cannot
be ignored with impunity. Further, the First Amendment Free
Exercise Clause regarding religious objections to medical treatment
may also protect an individual's right to bodily integrity.72  Mandat-
ing the use of Norplant violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment when such contraceptive practices oppose religious
married couples to use contraceptives). Accord Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
685-88 (1977) (stating that access to contraceptives is essential to exercising the protected right
of deciding whether to conceive a child).
66. Mandatory contraception laws preventing mothers on welfare from conceiving would
interfere with their fundamental right to parent. The Constitution protects this right under the
principle of family or parental autonomy. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)
(stating that the natural parents' fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and
management of their child is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (recognizing the fundamental right of parents to determine a child's
education); Laurence C. Nolan, Honor Thy Father and Mother: But Grandparent Visitation in the
Intact Family?, 8 B.Y.U.J. PUB. L. 51,53-54 (1993) (discussing the principle of parental autonomy
as part of the right to privacy interest).
Norplant legislation suggests that mothers on welfare are unfit to become parents. The
Supreme Court held that a conclusive presumption that all unwed fathers were unfit parents
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
649 (1972). Via a similar analysis, it would appear that such a presumption about mothers on
welfare would violate due process as well. Accord Charles W. Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded:
A Problem or a Solution?, 62 CAL. L. REV. 917, 928-32 (1974) (discussing issues surrounding
mentally retarded persons' fitness for parenthood as a basis for sterilization).
67. The Supreme Court has held, in cases of blood and marital relationships, that the
Constitution protects the right of family definition. SeeMoore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 499 (1977) (allowing a grandparent to define her family to include her children and
grandchildren). Norplant legislation would interfere with the welfare mother's right to define
her family to include additional children.
68. The branch of the right of privacy-expressed in terms of the autonomy of the
individual as a liberty interest-is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person shall be "deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (restating the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as applicable to the states).
69. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (recognizing a liberty
interest in avoiding unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs); Parham v. J.RI, 442 U.S.
584,597 (1979) (recognizing a child's liberty interests when involuntarily committed to a mental
hospital).
70. SeeArthur, supra note 10, at 93-94 (providing a general discourse on informed consent).
71. Arthur, supra note 10, at 93-96.
72. See Coale, supra note 13, at 206-08 (explaining the Free Exercise Clause and various
religious objections to contraceptives).
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beliefs.7" Clearly, Norplant legislation significantly affects individual
rights.
PART IV. THE ROLE OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
DOCTRINE IN THE DISCOURSE
Unless considered in the light of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine,74 it is likely that Norplant legislation will be judged merely
as social and economic legislation, rather than legislation adversely
impacting on the aforementioned constitutionally protected rights.
Courts use a rational standard to determine the constitutionality of
social and economic legislation, which requires the court to give
deference to the legislation.75 However, if Norplant legislation
directly affects constitutionally protected rights, the Court would
determine its constitutionality under a higher standard of review.
76
Thus, bringing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine into the
discourse may result in such legislation being reviewed under a higher
standard."
SECTION A. TE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
Legal scholars recognize the classical theory that the government
does not interfere in areas of personal decision-making.78 With the
growth of the modem regulatory state, however, the government
disburses benefits in all areas of American life.79 Consequently,
73. SeegenerallyJOHNT. NoONANJR., CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORYOFITSTREATMENT BYTHE
CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS (enlarged ed. 1986) (identifying the religious debates
behind contraceptive use).
74. The doctrine states that although the government may choose not to provide a benefit,
if it does so, then the government may not place a condition on the granting of that benefit.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAWV § 10-8, at 681 (2d ed. 1988). See alsosources cited, supra
note 15.
75. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (stating that in the area of
economic and social welfare, a state needs only a reasonable basis to satisfy the Equal Protection
Clause).
76. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing that a violation
of fundamental rights receives strict scrutiny by courts rather than rational review). See also infra
notes 146-49 and accompanying text (defining the two standards).
77. Carey v. Population Sevs. Int'l indicated that the Supreme Court would not only apply
strict scrutiny to those statutes entirely prohibiting abortion, but would also apply this standard
to those statutes limiting a woman's access to an abortion. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 688 (1977).
78. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772
(1986) ("Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a
certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of govern-
ment."); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1324-26 (1984); Gary A. Winters, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions as
"Nonsubsidies": When Is Deference Inappropriate?, 80 GEO. LJ. 131, 135 (1991).
79. See Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With
Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 593 (1990) (identifying
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government regulations increasingly affect constitutionally protected
rights indirectly."0  Such governmental activity as it relates to
constitutional issues is problematic. For instance, citizens cannot
claim an affirmative right to government aid.81 Since the govern-
ment is under no obligation to provide benefits, should the govern-
ment be able to attach conditions to achieve indirectly that which it
cannot do directly? The unconstitutional conditions doctrine answers
this inquiry.
The essence of the doctrine is that a government may not grant a
benefit with the condition that the recipient forego a constitutionally
protected right, even if the government has no duty, in the first place,
to provide the benefit.8 2 The doctrine, then, protects individuals
from a government's indirect actions which compromise constitution-
ally protected rights.
Having its genesis in the nineteenth century, 3 the doctrine was
molded during the "Lochner era" to protect economic liberties which,
at that time, were protected under substantive due process.84 This
judicially created doctrine is still applied post-"Lochner."85 Oppo-
nents, such as Justice Holmes, argue that this doctrine does not exist
since the greater power of the state not to create a benefit includes
the lesser power to impose the condition. 6 The next section
spending, licensing, and employment as areas of increased government regulation).
80. Sunstein, supra note 79, at 598-99; Kreimer, supra note 78, at 1296-97.
81. The government generally has no affirmative duties, only negative ones. See DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) ("[O]ur cases have
recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental
aid, even when such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which
the government itself may not deprive the individual.").
82. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1415. Accord Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)
(explaining the doctrine in terms of the protected interest in freedom of speech).
83. Richard A. Epstein, TheSupreme Court 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State
Power, and the Limits of Consen 102 HARV. L. REV. 5, 10 (1988).
84. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1416 (commenting that traces of the statement of the
doctrine appeared in earlier cases where courts have held that states cannot condition privileges
on the surrender of constitutional rights). See, e.g., Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U.S.
535, 543 (1876) (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("Though a State may have the power, if it sees fit to
subject its citizens to the inconvenience, of prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting
business within itsjurisdiction, it has no power to impose unconstitutional conditions upon their
doing so."); Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1856) (maintaining
that Ohio could condition a foreign corporation's consent to do business in the state "provided
they are not repugnant to the [C]onstitution or laws of the United States").
85. Epstein, supra note 83, at 5-7; see also Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1428-42 (describing how
the doctrine developed in three areas of the law: state regulations against corporate rights,
federal encroachment on state autonomy, and federal and state regulations against individual
rights).
86. See, e.g., Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1909) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("Even in the law the whole generally includes its parts. If the State may prohibit,
it may prohibit with the privilege of avoiding the prohibition in a certain way.").
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contends that the doctrine is still necessary because of the effect the
growing regulatory state has on welfare benefits.
SECTION B. THE ROLE OF THE DOCTRINE IN THE WELFARE REFORM
DISCOURSE
Today, the government has very broad powers to dispense
welfare benefits with conditions that affect constitutionally protected
rights, though indirectly." Such conditions make it easier for the
government to be less cognizant of these protected rights. The
doctrine fulfills the need "to mediate the boundary between constitu-
tional rights and government prerogatives in the area of spending."88
Making the doctrine part of this discourse on Norplant and welfare
reform, therefore, provides legislatures and courts with the proper
framework against which to view the constitutionality of such
conditions.
Foremost, the doctrine serves to safeguard the individual's
protected rights from government manipulation.89 Since the New
Deal, the doctrine's protector role has gained significance in light of
the government's expanded regulatory powers over social and
economic programs.90 Before the 1930s, poor people relied primari-
ly upon private sources for welfare benefits. 1 The government has
now assumed the central role in providing these benefits. 2 As a
result, private funding sources have become scarce or have disap-
peared altogether, and the government's role today is basically
87. See Hand, supra note 14, at 743,753 (commenting that the Supreme Court can examine
the right involved, determine that the right is not unduly burdened by the condition, and
uphold the condition). The Court typically does not overturn conditional laws when the benefit
involved is welfare. Id.
88. Sunstein, supra note 79, at 593.
89. See Epstein, supra note 83, at 28 (commenting that the doctrine is a "second best
approach" to controlling government discretion which is used to "take back" some of the power
which was originally conferred upon government).
90. SeeJoel F. Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in =elfare Administration, 54 CAL. L. REV.
479,492-500 (1966) (discussing the governmental interference and manipulation that occurs in
welfare administration and the limited judicial procedures established to protect welfare
recipients' rights against such intrusion).
91. See Kreimer, supra note 78, at 1296 (stating that poor individuals previously relied on
the church and family for support); see also Michael M. Maddigan, TheEstablishment Clause, Civil
Religion, and the Public Church, 81 CAL. L. REV. 293, 329 (1993) (commenting that after the New
Deal, the government created numerous welfare programs which were traditionally functions
exercised by the private sector).
92. Kreimer, supra note 78, at 1296 (observing that since the government has inherited the
educational and welfare functions from the church and family, there are opportunities for
government intrusion through the allocation of benefits).
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monopolistic." The doctrine is useful in this discourse to provide
a check "against the political perils of monopoly."94
With the government in this "monopolistic" role as welfare
provider, it can easily abuse its power. Norplant legislation may be an
illustration of such abuse. A law making Norplant mandatory for a
woman on welfare leaves two unsatisfactory choices for the woman:
either accept welfare benefits conditionally or not at all. Such choices
allow a government to foster its goals 5 at the expense of the
mother's protected reproductive rights. Similarly, if bonuses are
provided for women on welfare who agree to use Norplant, the
government gains increased leverage over a welfare mother's
constitutionally protected reproductive rights.96 In this light, the
government's offer of a bonus is not benign legislation. It is a
cunning incentive to poor mothers to forego their constitutionally
protected rights in exchange for their most immediate need:
money.9 7  It encourages poor women to forego their reproductive
rights in choosing whether to use a contraceptive as well as what type
of contraceptive to use.
93. See Maddigan, supra note 91, at 329-30 (stating that the government's acquisition of
welfare functions, which had traditionally been the responsibility of the private sector, limited
the private sector's ability to provide opportunities for its citizens). But Cf. WALTER I. TRATrNER,
FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 257-61 (3d ed.
1984) (stating that the inability of the private sector to provide the financial resources necessary
was a factor in the growth of federal welfare).
94. Epstein, supra note 83, at 15. See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions
and the Distribution of Liberty, 26 SAN DIEGO L REv. 327, 330 (1989) (describing this function as
"state checking" since the power of the state is checked by maintaining the boundary between
public and private spheres).
95. For example, Roland Coming, the author of a South Carolina bill, said on ABC
Primetime that taxpayers are tired of making welfare payments to women who continue to have
children: "They can have all the children they want. Theyjust have to pay for them." Primetime
Live, supra note 6.
96. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1492-93 (stating that the government overreaches when
it forbids actions protected by individual rights of reproductive privacy); see also Charles A. Reich,
Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of the Due Process, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 731, 738 (1990)
("If benefits necessary to the survival of the individual are the property of the government, then
these benefits become an instrument of social control. The government can impose conditions,
supervise the behavior of the recipients, or deny them the control over their lives that most
other citizens take for granted.").
97. Commenting on the proposed Kansas bill to give a bonus to welfare mothers who
choose to use Norplant, Kansas Representative Kathleen Sibelius stated, "The idea of choice, I
think, is removed, if you have a starving person and you offer them food if they will do
something. I don't think that's a very realistic choice." 60 Minutes: Norplant (CBS television
broadcast, Nov. 10, 1991, cited in Henley, supra note 10, at 769). See also Charlotte Rutherford,
Reproductive Freedoms and African American Women, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 255, 262 (1992)
(commenting that some argue that offering cash bonuses should not be allowed because it
emphasizes the wrong issue for the cause of poverty). By limiting poor women's procreational
rights, issues of racism, sexism, and classism will not be eliminated. These issues are the root
cause of poverty. Id.
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The government may argue that since welfare benefits are
gratuities, it may attach conditions. These conditions become of great
concern when the state is acting as a "monopoly." Citizens, who do
not have real options,8 are placed in the unfair position of having
to give up constitutionally protected rights in order to accept the
government's gratuities. On the other hand, the government may
argue that when it provides welfare benefits, the government and its
citizens are acting more along "contract principles." Citizens are free
either to accept or to refuse the government's offer. However, the
government may become coercive in its demands when welfare
mothers look to it as their only source of income.
Even if the government is not acting monopolistically, the doctrine
preserves "private ordering"99 in decision-making in which the
government should have no power to control. Decisions regarding
reproductive rights are in the private realm.'00 Norplant legislation
allows the government to be in a position to take advantage of a
welfare mother's plight and to influence her constitutionally protected
reproductive decisions. The fact that Norplant does not require the
woman's cooperation to be effective, once implanted, allows the
government to assert control over her fertility with relative ease."'
There is but one male contraceptive-the condom-and it is not
comparable to Norplant.'02 Whenever the government can assert
such control over a woman's decisions about her reproductive rights,
these decisions are removed from the private realm. If the govern-
ment could not enact legislation which directly asserted this control
without showing a compelling state interest, neither should it be able
to do so indirectly.
As a direct consequence of legislation allowing the government to
influence a woman's reproductive decisions, the government is able
to engage in the social engineering of family structures by gender,
class, and race.0 3 Norplant legislation affects only poor women
98. There is always the argument that there is an alternative: "Get ajob."
99. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1492-96 (discussing the occurrence of "private ordering"
when the government shifts the boundary between private and public ordering through its
allocation of benefits). The unconstitutional conditions doctrine preserves this boundary.
100. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1492.
101. See supra part II (discussing the fact that Norplant does not depend upon the
cooperation of the user to be effective since it cannot be removed without medical assistance).
102. SeeBallard, supra note 10, at 161 (commenting that establishing Norplant as a condition
for probation violates equal protection because there is no approved long-term male
contraceptive). Indeed, other than sterilization or the use of condoms, there are no controls
over male fertility.
103. See generally Rutherford, supra note 97 (conveying that Norplant, like cash bonuses, is
linked to issues of race, gender, and class).
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receiving aid for dependent children."' Many proponents advocate
Norplant legislation to reduce this particular class of welfare recipi-
ents.1 15  These proponents believe this class should be reduced
because it continues intergenerational dependency on welfare.10 6
They say that only mothers who can afford additional children
without welfare benefits should procreate: no more children should
be born to a family that depends on welfare benefits.10 7 By manipu-
lating reproductive decisions, the government would be directly
engineering the family structure of these welfare recipients. Such
decisions on family structure are, however, in the private realm of
decision-making, not in the government's realm. 08
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine would encourage
"government evenhandedness" or neutrality among its citizens in their
constitutionally protected decision-making. 9 The Supreme Court
has held that courts should defer to democratic decision-making in
ordinary distributive matters. 0 Professor Stephen Loffredo notes
that the Supreme Court bases its deference to social and economic
legislation upon both the theory that decision-making in the
legislature is democratic, and the assumption that poor people have
fair access to this process."' He argues, however, that poor people
do not have fair access." 2
If poor people do not have fair access to the democratic process,
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides a greater likelihood
of the government's evenhandedness in its enactment of Norplant
104. See supra note 55 (illustrating how Norplant legislation affects a large number of
minority women).
105. E.g., Donald Kimelman, Poverty and Norplant: Can Contraception Reduce the Underclass?,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 12, 1990, at A18 [hereinafter PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER]
(recommending that Norplant be made available to African-American women who are members
of the underclass).
106. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining the proponents' fear of the lack of
work ethic instilled in recipients of AFDC benefits).
107. See Primetime Liv4 supra note 6 (explaining the argument that taxpayers do not want to
support women who continue to have more children).
108. Carl R. Schneider, MoralDiscourse and the Transformation ofAmerican Family Law, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1803, 1833-42 (1985).
109. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1496-97 and Sullivan, supra note 94, at 331 which state
that this doctrine imposes on the government an obligation of neutrality, such as that found in
speech or religion, to not use benefits to shift viewpoints.
110. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 596-97 (1987) (holding that "unless the
Legislative Branch's decisions run afoul of some constitutional edict, any inequities created by
such decisions must be remedied by the democratic process").
111. Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277,
1277-85 (1993).
112. See generally id. (offering the argument that because poor persons do not have access
to the democratic process, their constitutional rights are not adequately protected).
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legislation.' Norplant legislation allows the government to favor
the reproductive rights of non-welfare mothers, as they are free to
exercise their reproductive rights while welfare mothers must pay a
higher price to do so."' The unconstitutional conditions doctrine
affords a method to ensure that the government is evenhanded in its
dealings between these two classes of women." 5 If the doctrine is
not part of the discourse, Norplant legislation may be judged merely
as social and economic legislation under the ruse that it does not
directly affect reproductive rights.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine also deters the govern-
ment from making hasty decisions in times of crises regarding
Norplant."t  Norplant legislation first arose during a climate of
severe budgetary constraints.117 Its proponents argued that it would
save money and reduce the budget,"8 ignoring that other conse-
quences would also follow. This legislation will shape the child-
bearing rights of poor women and will allow the government to
regulate an intimate aspect of the lives of one group of its citi-
zens." 9 It will allow the government to engage in social engineer-
ing of family structures based on gender, race, and class. Ironically,
it may encourage promiscuous sexual behavior because of the
spontaneity that Norplant allows, increasing the risks of AIDS and
other sexually transmitted diseases. 2 Moreover, legislation mandat-
ing Norplant for welfare recipients will deny the state's most
vulnerable citizens, dependent children, a subsistence income if their
mothers refuse to give up their constitutional rights. Legislatures
must confront these consequences of Norplant legislation. Without
including the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in this discourse,
113. SeeSkinnerv. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 536,546 (1942) (Jackson,J, concurring) (stating that
"there are limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may conduct
biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers of a
minority").
114. See generally Coale, supra note 13, at 208-10 (stating that Norplant legislation places
surcharges on poor women).
115. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1496-97.
116. See, e.g., supra notes 2-3 (describing Congress and states' quick solutions to the welfare
problem).
117. See Primetime Live, supra note 6 (describing the pro-Norplant argument that AFDC
recipients are costly to taxpayers).
118. Primetime Liv4 supra note 6; see also Kerry Patrick, Poor Women and Society Benefit by Linking
Norplant, Welfare Aid, WICHITA EAGLE, Mar. 4, 1991, at All (advocating the passage of his
Norplant bonus bill because it would eventually save thousands of dollars in welfare payments).
119. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (indicating that Norplant legislation would
interfere with the fundamental right to parent).
120. See NORPLANT AND POOR WOMEN, supra note 47, at xiv-xv (explaining that Norplant
prevents pregnancy but does not protect against transmission of AIDS or other sexually
transmitted diseases).
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the government may not stop and re-evaluate the conditions attached
to the welfare benefits.2
In times of budgetary crisis, legislatures may be more likely to
follow popular opinions and prejudices in their haste to meet the
crisis and silence critics. Norplant legislation promotes the theme
that the government should only help the deserving poor.122
Norplant legislation proponents argue that the undeserving poor, now
termed the underclass, should be reduced.123 The stereotype of this
class includes welfare mothers who stay on welfare in order to avoid
working and welfare mothers who continue to have children in order
to continue receiving welfare.1 24  This stereotype is unsupported in
fact and contrary to recent studies. 125  As part of the discourse, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine would moderate legislative
vulnerability to biased, popular beliefs and would encourage more
careful analysis of the constitutional issues involved. 26
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine serves to prevent the
government from creating what Professor Kathleen Sullivan terms "a
caste system among right-holders." 27 Some constitutional rights are
too fundamental to be distributed in creating a hierarchy among
121. Coale, supra note 13, at 203 n.105.
122. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (noting that the proponents of this
legislation assert that AFDC creates a class of undeserving poor: those who do not work, those
who continue to be dependent upon government largess, and those who continue to have
children out of wedlock).
123. Ross, supra note 32, at 1507-08; see PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, supra note 105 (describing
how society would be better off if Norplant were used to reduce the number of children born
into poverty).
124. Henley, supra note 10, at 753 n.315.
125. Henley, supra note 10, at 753 nn.316-17; see also Barbara Vobejda, Gauging Welfare's Role
in Motherhood: Sociologists Question Whether "Family Caps'Are a Legitimate Solution, WASH. POsrJune
2, 1994, at Al (reporting that social scientists doubt the existence of a causal link between
welfare benefits and birth rates).
126. Popular opinions and prejudices are similar to myths: partly true and partly false. See
GregJ. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, Teenage Welfare Receipt and SubsequentDependence AmongBlack
Adolescent Mothers, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 16, 16 (1990) (showing how the argument that welfare
creates dependency and is systemic to future generations can be supported by studies that show
black teenage mothers receiving AFDC are more likely to continue to be dependent on AFDC
at age 26 than those who do not have children); Table prepared by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, on file with DHS
(providing statistics showing that welfare recipients have additional children). But see Unplanned
Pregnancy is Main Cause of Welfare Reliance, Survey Finds, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 186 (1981) (noting
that studies show an unplanned pregnancy is the main cause of welfare dependency); Henley,
supra note 10, at 753 nn.316-17 (noting that numerous studies do not support the argument that
welfare mothers have additional children to increase their payments and arguing that Norplant
legislation was inspired by the myth that women's conduct can be explained by and controlled
through their reproductive capacity). See also Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1438, 1444
(1991) (discussing the myth of the promiscuous blackwoman which was prevalent from the time
of slavery).
127. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1497-99.
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classes who would make the same choice except for the government's
intervention. 2 ' Dependency on welfare benefits defines the class.
Conditioning the exercise of procreational rights on the receipt of
welfare benefits creates a caste constitutionally inferior to those not
receiving welfare benefits.'29 This class is deemed unfit to procre-
ate. 130 Additionally, such legislation punishes poor women and their
children who do not choose to accept the condition. The unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine would, however, require the same standard
for judging the constitutionality of laws affecting procreational rights,
regardless of whether such laws are direct or indirect.'3 '
Norplant legislation resembles legislation from the eugenics
movement in the first quarter of this century, the premise being that
only the biologically fit should procreate. 3 2  Mandatory Norplant
legislation would also deny procreation rights to certain people, i.e.,
mothers who are AFDC recipients. The development of surgical
techniques for sterilization, such as vasectomy and tubal ligation,
increased the call for the passage of eugenic sterilization laws in some
states133 because castration could be supplanted by these more
aesthetic and humane procedures. 3 4 Similarly, the attractiveness of
Norplant as a contraceptive increased the call for Norplant legisla-
tion. 3 ' Once Norplant is implanted, the state does not depend on
the user to control her fertility: the contraceptive stays implanted until
surgically removed; it is easy to monitor; it is nearly ninety-nine
percent effective; and its effectiveness can last up to five years.'3 6
Finally, the doctrine serves as a warning that the government may
be unconstitutionally affecting a protected right.'37 As previously
discussed, Norplant legislation would affect the fundamental right to
procreate. 3 8  The Supreme Court stated in Meyer v. Nebraska'39
128. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1498.
129. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1498.
130. See Murdock, supra note 66, at 928-32 (discussing how one might perceive the
foundation of sterilization laws to be unfitness for parenthood).
131. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1498.
132. Walker, supra note 10, at 780 (explaining that the biological "fit" is defined according
to the definer). See RobertJ. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 1418, 1431-32 (1981) (stating that sterilization laws were also premised on
punishment and therapeutic motives).
133. Cynkar, supra note 132, at 1433.
134. Cynkar, supra note 132, at 1433.
135. Seesupranotes 45-54 and accompanying text (describing the Norplant contraceptive and
its appeal to legislators).
136. NORPLANT AND POOR WOMEN, supra note 47, at xi.
137. See generally Sunstein, supra note 79 (noting the government's ability to affect lives
through means other than criminal sanctions).
138. See supra part III (providing a description of other rights which are affected).
139. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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that the right to start a family and raise children is constitutionally
protected. 4 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,'41 the Court stated that mar-
riage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the human race. 42 More recently, the Court, in Carey v.
Population Services Internationa4l" stated that the choice of whether
to beget or bear a child is protected.' The right to procreate and
its component parts are thus basic personal rights. The doctrine,
therefore, allows for an analysis of the type of right involved and the
consequences of attaching the condition."
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has an important role in
this discourse. It provides the proper backdrop against which to view
Norplant legislation when weighing the extent to which the condition
will affect a welfare mother's constitutional rights.
SECTION C. THE APPLICATION OF TiE DOCTRINE
Including the doctrine in this discourse helps one see why the
standard for determining the constitutionality of Norplant legislation
should be the same as if the legislation directly affected a constitution-
ally protected right. Since the 1930s, the Supreme Court has, as
previously discussed, reviewed social and economic legislation under
a rational basis standard.'46 This standard provides that the govern-
ment must show that legislation has a rational relationship to a
permissible state interest.47 Legislation directly affecting constitu-
tionally protected rights is reviewed under a strict scrutiny stan-
dard.'48 This standard provides that the state must show a compel-
ling interest for the legislation which must also be narrowly drawn to
achieve only that legitimate interest.149
140. Id.
141. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
142. Id. at 541.
143. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
144. Id. at 685.
145. See infra note 161 (suggesting that the standard of review under the doctrine should
take an equal protection approach). Although equality issues almost always arise with
unconstitutional conditions, the doctrine centers on the right that is affected. Id.
146. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a rational basis standard for
evaluating welfare classifications); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (upholding a provision
of the Federal Food Stamp Act under rational review and rejecting the argument that this
classification is subject to heightened scrutiny).
147. Dandridge 397 U.S. at 485-86.
148. See Santosky II v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (affirming the need for a compelling
state interest when deciding whether to terminate parental rights).
149. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (holding that
a regulation suppressing controversial inserts in utility bills is notjustified by a compelling state
interest).
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The Supreme Court has never held that there is a constitutionally
protected right to welfare benefits. 5 ' Since the government has no
obligation to provide welfare benefits, welfare legislation is usually
reviewed under a rational basis standard.' As previously discussed,
among the fundamental rights that Norplant legislation affects is the
right to procreate. 5 2  Norplant legislation, therefore, may be
reviewed under this minimum level of scrutiny since it does not
directly affect a constitutionally protected right.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides that the
government should not be able to do indirectly what it cannot do
directly.'53 The Supreme Court has not, however, applied the
doctrine as it is literally stated.' That is, any condition indirectly
affecting a protected right will be reviewed as if its impact were
direct.'55 Legislation directly affecting a protected right, such as the
right to procreate, would be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard.
Instead, the Court has sought to determine which conditions affecting
constitutional rights should come under the doctrine.
Furthermore, the Court's approach in determining which condi-
tions trigger the doctrine has been inconsistent. The Court uses
150. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a Maryland AFDC program
provision imposing a maximum monthly grant per family as constitutionally valid).
151. The Court has applied different standards of scrutiny based on the legislation involved.
See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (explaining that although the
legislation discriminates on the basis of gender, current law provides for review under a standard
lower than strict scrutiny); see alsoYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 351,373-74 (1886) (holding that
discrimination which is based on race is subject to a strict scrutiny standard of review); but see
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that legislation which has a disparate impact
on race does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless objective evidence shows that the
law was purposefully designed to discriminate invidiously on the basis of race). The Supreme
Court has been reluctant to find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause unless the legislation
facially discriminates on the basis of race. Id. See also Henley, supra note 10, at 148 n.271
(explaining that Norplant legislation is facially neutral as to race, but disproportionately affects
minorities since there is a high percentage of minority women who have families below the
poverty line); David Robert Baron, The Racially Disparate Impact of Restrictions on the Public Funding
of Abortion: An Analysis of Current Equal Protection Doctrine, 13 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 1 (1993)
(describing statutory restrictions on abortion as a form of government discrimination against
minorities and a violation of equal protection laws).
152. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing Norplant's relationship to
fundamental rights, such as procreation, parenting, contraceptive use, and other personal
decisions which should remain free from governmental interference).
153. See Charles R. Bogle, "Unconscionable" Conditions: A Contractual Analysis of Conditions on
Public Assistance Benefits, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 193 (1994) (discussing government methods for
dealing with undesirable behavior in society).
154. See supra text accompanying note 111 (noting the Supreme Court's historical position
on applying the doctrine to social and economic legislation).
155. See Sullivan, supra note 15 and accompanying text (explaining that the doctrine must
be interpreted in a way that prevents government from indirectly impinging on protected
rights).
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theories of germaneness, 56  inalienability,57  and coercion15 8  to
determine whether a particular condition triggers the doctrine. The
Court has most frequently used various reformulated versions of the
coercion theory 5 9 Presently, the Court appears to be approaching
the doctrine from the standpoint of government's presumptive power
to allocate resources according to its selections. There is no coercion
if the allocation results as a nonsubsidy instead of a penalty. 60
Commentators have tried to reconcile the various approaches of the
Supreme Court and have concluded that there is no reconcilia-
tion." One is not able, therefore, to predict with any certainty
whether the Supreme Court would determine that the unconstitution-
al conditions doctrine applies to the Norplant legislation.6 2
156. Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 CoLuM. L. REv.
321 (1935) (noting that the less germane the purpose of the condition is to the underlying
benefit, the more it looks like an unconstitutional condition). See Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that the Commission cannot condition the issuance of
a building permit on reasons which are not germane, even to an outright denial of the permit).
157. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1477-89 (noting that some rights, such as procreational ones
which are inherent and biological, should not be traded because they are central attributes of
personal identity).
158. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1428-56 (noting that the coercion theory identifies unconstitu-
tional conditions as those that have a coercive effect on the individual's exercise of his/her
right).
159. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1428-56 (describing the Court's inconsistencies in
determining what constitutes coercion). The Supreme Court has not, however, developed a
paradigm for determining coercion. It has focused at times on whether the condition acts as
a penalty, at other times on whether the condition acts as a deterrent, and at other times on the
coercive effect of making the choice. Id.
160. Winters, supra note 78, at 132-33 (emphasizing the Court's change from a penalty focus
to one of encouraging or discouraging alternative choices). The government can choose to
subsidize or not to subsidize. Id. See also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (noting that
funding to subsidize non-abortion family planning instead of abortion-related family planning
is a legitimate choice); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (stating that funding to subsidize
childbirth expenses instead of abortion expenses is a legitimate choice).
161. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 15, at 1196-97 (proposing some theories on when to apply
the doctrine); Epstein, supra note 83, at 6-14 (referring to the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine as "mysterious" since it has different meanings in different contexts); Sullivan, supra
note 15, at 1415-16 ("[R]ecent Supreme Court decisions on challenges to unconstitutional
conditions seem a minefield to be traversed gingerly. Just when the doctrine appears secure,
new decisions arise to explode it."). See also Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1491-99 (focusing on the
effect of the doctrine being raised when a condition affects any of the following: private
ordering, government evenhandedness, and constitutional caste). Professor Sullivan has rejected
the theories of coercion, germaneness, and inalienability as unhelpful. Id. See Kreimer, supra
note 78, at 1359-74 (suggesting that an unconstitutional condition arises if predictive, historical,
and equality baselines show the condition penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right);
Patricia M. Wald, Government Benefits: A New Look at an Old GCfhors 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 256
(1990) (suggesting an equal protection type of analysis, applying a heightened standard of
review, where the state would have to show that the condition was substantially related to
important purposes since a condition that limits a constitutional right creates a suspect
classification); Gary Feinerman, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Crossroads of Substantive Rights and
Equal Protection, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1991) (expanding on Judge Wald's approach).
162. See Baker, supra note 15, at 1187 (writing that the Supreme Court articulates a positive
rule for unconstitutional conditions cases that involve public assistance programs). According
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This article posits that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
should be applied to Norplant welfare legislation as if the legislation
were directly affecting a woman's procreational rights.'63 The
purpose of the doctrine is to prevent the government from doing
indirectly what it cannot do directly regarding constitutional
rights." An analysis of whether the doctrine applies ends by
determining if a condition is affecting a constitutionally protected
right. Further analysis beyond this determination defeats the purpose
of the doctrine and creates the possibility that identical affected rights
will be judged by different standards.' 65
There is risk to individual freedom, as this article argues, in
allowing the government to use conditions to do indirectly what it
cannot do directly. To minimize this risk, it is crucial that one
standard be applied to legislation affecting identical constitutionally
protected rights. This approach is the fair way to determine the
constitutionality of Norplant legislation. It protects the rights of the
individual from government's indirect regulations.
It is only when the appropriate standard has been identified, and
is applied, that the constitutionality of the condition should be
judged. A welfare reform statute should stand or fall under the same
standard as if its effect were direct. This approach, however, does not
mean that the application of the same standard to direct and indirect
legislation would yield the same result.166  It only means that
to Baker's theory, if the Court determines that a constitutional right is involved, it then
determines whether the condition requires those unable to earn a subsistence income - who
are otherwise eligible for AFDC benefits - to pay a higher price to exercise the right than those
earning an income. Id. See also Coale, supra note 13, at 193, 208 (concluding that Norplant
incentive bonuses do require poor women to pay a higher price to exercise their constitutional
rights).
163. Sunstein, supra note 79, at 595 (writing that the doctrine is an anachronism and should
be abolished). Instead, the constitutionality of conditions should be "an approach that asks
whether, under the provision at issue, the government has constitutionally sufficientjustifications
for affecting constitutionally protected interests." Id. It is not clear, however, whether
"constitutionally sufficient justifications" are the equivalent to this article's approach: namely,
that the standard for evaluating the constitutionality of the condition should be the same
standard that would be used if the legislation directly affected the protected interest.
164. See Sullivan, supra note 15 and accompanying text (asserting that an individual should
not change his/her constitutionally protected behavior or choices because of governmental
interference or conditions).
165. For example, if the legislation required women to use Norplant as a condition to re-
ceiving AFDC, and if the legislation were determined to be merely social and economic
legislation, the constitutionality of the condition would be judged under the rational basis
standard. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). If the legislation required all women
to use Norplant, it would be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Both laws would affect
procreational rights. Seesupra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the application ofstrict
scrutiny to the parallel issue of abortion rights).
166. It is during the application of the standard that the court weighs such interests of the
state in Norplant legislation against the curtailment of the individual's right. For example, the
state's interests in Norplant legislation may vary from increasing the health of poor women, to
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legislation affecting the same right would be reviewed under a
common standard. In this way, protected rights would be judged and
treated alike. The constitutionality of Norplant legislation should,
therefore, be judged by the same standard as if the legislation directly
affected constitutionally protected rights.
CONCLUSION
As the government has become more powerful in its regulation of
benefits in American life, the conditions it imposes in exchange for
benefits become extremely significant. This is especially true
regarding AFDC benefits. These benefits provide subsistence income
for poor mothers and their children. The options for such families
to obtain subsistence income elsewhere are negligible. Under such
circumstances, the power of the government to impose conditions on
AFDC benefits increases while the recipients' other options, if they
choose to forego the benefit, are reduced. Moreover, the pervasive
potential of the government's use of Norplant to influence reproduc-
tive rights critically increases the significance of conditioning AFDC
benefits. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine serves to prevent
possible overreaching when constitutional rights are affected. The
doctrine should be part of the discourse regarding welfare benefits
and Norplant legislation, for it will serve as a constant reminder that
the government should not be able to do indirectly that which it
cannot do directly.
ecological concerns of population control, to the welfare of unborn children, to the judicial
recognition that "states have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,478 (1970). These interests may or may not be compelling
when the standard is applied to the legislation, whether direct or indirect. And, applying the
standard to Norplant bonus legislation may give a different result than when applying the
standard to Norplant legislation mandating its use to all recipients. What is crucial, however,
is that the same standard is being applied to legislation affecting identical constitutionally
protected rights.
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